	CRET		
	The Director of Centr	_	
	Washington, D.C.	20505	
National Intelligence	Council	NIC-05300-86/1 26 November 1986	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Distribution		
FROM:	Acting National Intellig	ence Officer for Europe	
SUBJECT:	November Warning and For	ecast Report	
3. I also e	ers to make opening prese	suggestions for the agenda and ntations. It would be helpful to y Thursday, 11 December 1986.	
Attachment			
Attachment			
	en separated from attachmen	nt.	

SECRET

Sanitized Cor	py Approved for Release 2011/07/07 : CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080016-9	
	SECRET	25 X 1
	The Director of Central Intelligence	
	Washington, D.C. 20505	
	•	
National Intelligence	Council	
J		
	NIC-05300/86	
	26 November 1986	
MEMORANDUM 500		
MEMORANDUM FOR	: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
EDOM.	Topus, 11. cook. of sensital lineeringence	05V4
FROM:	Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe	25X1
CUDIFOT		
SUBJECT:	November Warning and Forecast Report	
Western Europe	After Reykjavik	
1. Discuss	sion. Despite continued popular misgivings in Western Europe	
about US commit	tment to arms control and adherence to SDI, the debate among	
Allied governme	ents has undergone a decisive shift away from pushing arms	

control issues and toward a sober reassessment of NATO security policy. The nuclear zero option raises grave doubts among our closest allies about our consideration of their separate security interests and reinvigorates old fears about US decoupling from Western Europe. In short, Reykjavik frightened the Center-Right in Western Europe even more than it alienated the Left.

The domestic repercussions of Reykjavik were unsettling but have not translated into significant gains for the Left.

> -- UK. Mrs. Thatcher's efforts to dramatize the irresponsibility of Labor's security program and defend her government's commitment to Trident were undermined by Reykjavik. She returned from Camp David somewhat strengthened, however, and better armed to counter Labor's line that Reykjavik vindicates its own unilateralist prescriptions. Owing chiefly to defections from the SDP/Liberal alliance over security issues, the British Left has actually lost considerable ground in recent polls.

> > CL BY SIGNER DECL OADR DERV MULTIPLE

SECRET	
--------	--

SECRET	
--------	--

- -- West Germany. In addition to raising new fears of US decoupling, Reykjavik has highlighted differences within the CDU over how these arms control proposals, particularly a possible US-Soviet INF accord, would affect German security. The SPD, battered by the Hamburg elections and the latest turn of the Neue Heimat scandal, has been unable to capitalize on post-Reykjavik anxieties among the population at large.
- -- France. Government officials and party leaders across the political spectrum are expressing dismay at the ballistic missile zero option and the erosion of European confidence in American leadership. They also fear that any follow-on to the Reykjavik proposals could undermine the domestic consensus on defense issues. For now, though, the main impact has been to strengthen French commitment to its own force de frappe, as well as to a credible NATO deterrent posture.

For the immediate future, our West European allies will be preoccupied with issues of nuclear deterrence and NATO strategy and hence will be less eager to press for new US-Soviet arms agreements. But confidence in American leadership has been badly shaken, particularly among those most favorably disposed toward us.

The perceived danger of a US-Soviet nuclear condominium has already stimulated European collaboration on security issues. Given the meager results of earlier collaborative efforts through the West European Union, however, the new trilateral working group is not likely to go much beyond its immediate goal of exerting pressure on the US to avert a repetition of Reykjavik. Either individually or in concert, the West Europeans will continue to press hard for improved prior consultations -- like the Nitze visits earlier in the year, rather than the post-Reykjavik briefings on a fait accompli. Their major efforts will be to press us to:

- -- reaffirm the nuclear deterrent as the underpinning of the Atlantic Alliance:
- -- abandon the nuclear zero option (though a 50 percent reduction might be acceptable);
- -- postpone talk of sweeping cuts in ballistic missiles until agreement on reducing conventional and tactical forces in Europe is secured;
- -- consider major INF reductions only when there is a firm agreement for a follow-on reduction of SRINF; and
- -- address more urgently the conventional force imbalance in Europe, working out some compromise to accommodate French opposition to bloc-to-bloc negotiations.

			SECRET			
isarray n arms resent he Sovi uropean ecently ith the uclear apitals xerting riticiz S-Sovie orm, ho	by Reykjav control has stress on ets had acc s" theme la bypassed E US; and the deterrence For now, heavy-hand ing Kohl fo t arms nego	paganda mach vik's afterm s been the c linkage runs crued over tacks all pla Europe to ta he Soviets c and NATO stocked pressure or his standotiations stoviets agaensive."	ath. To li hief questi the risk o he past yea usibility c ble sweepin annot be pl rategy now s have exch on the Dut in favor o all and the	nk or not to on since Re f destroying r. More bacoming from g proposals eased with current in to anged the co ch to halt f nuclear despublic mook	o link SDI ykjavik, and g the propagation of the solution of the control of the c	to progress d the ganda gains e "we ader who so al talks g debate on an he stick, ent and If reverts to
	peace of re					


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1